The holding of elections has become universal but only about half of all elections have been free and fair. Electoral malpractice not only distorts the quality of representation but has implications for political, social and economic outcomes. Existing datasets either provide broad information on election quality for large panels or they provide very detailed information on electoral processes and events for a small number of elections. Our data collection effort closes this gap. We provide an assessment of elections that is closely tied to the commonly used term 'free and fair' and base this proxy on ten variables for a global panel. Our preliminary results suggest that there are a number of elections that are unfree but fair. Most observer organisations concentrate on the election as an event, i.e. whether the election was fair. We therefore recommend that international organisations should put more emphasis on monitoring the run up to the elections, i.e. whether the elections were free.
Introduction
Almost all countries hold elections to determine their leaders, only 14 countries did not hold national elections during the past decade 1 . However, our newly collected database suggests that only about half of all the elections were free and fair. Electoral malpractice is widespread and many elections do not reflect the will of the people.
If many elections are not designed to offer a free and fair choice, why are elections so popular? After the fall of the Soviet Union we experienced a global 'fourth wave of democratization ' (McFaul, 2002) . The popular uprisings in Central and Eastern Europe provided a template for populations across the world to demand participation in the process of choosing their leaders. The end of the Cold War also meant that donors did no longer have to support authoritarian rulers for geo-strategic reasons. Thus, internal and external pressures lead to elections becoming a worldwide norm. Autocrats conceded elections because it was not possible to stay in power if they refused to hold elections. Elections serve a number of purposes in authoritarian regimes (Schedler, 2013, chapter 5) . Multiparty elections provide internal and external legitimacy of the regime. They also produce information on allies, voters and adversaries and during the election process rulers can disseminate information on the power and determination of their regime. Although elections place some constraints on the autocrat they do also constrain challengers. By allowing the opportunity to challenge the regime at the polls they create constraints on non-electoral challenges. Often the autocrats' rule is threatened by the military and elections provide some 'coup-proofing' of the regime.
Most of our information on election quality comes from international observer organisations.
If many authoritarian regimes have no intention of holding free and fair elections, why do they let international organisations observe their elections and potentially uncover electoral fraud? Like holding elections, their observation has become the international norm (Hyde, 2011) . The number of observed elections has steadily increased over time and it has become internationally expected behaviour to invite election observers. This behaviour is designed to signal a democratic intention to donors and investors.
Why is electoral (mal)practice an important issue? Apart from reducing the objective quality of representation, poor electoral quality also has implications for political, social and 4 economic outcomes (Birch, 2011) . One example is the study by Chauvet and Collier (2009) who investigate the relationship between elections and government economic choices in developing countries. They find that regular elections have structural effects, they improve the overall level of policies. However, if the elections are of low quality, they exert no significant policy discipline. For economic outcomes Collier and Hoeffler (2014) show that elections matter. Free and fair elections discipline leaders and they provide economic growth to increase their chances of political survival.
In order to examine the quality of elections we focus on whether the elections are 'free and fair'. This has become a very popular term to describe elections. Figure 1 provides a count of how many times the expression 'free and fair election' is mentioned. Up until the 1960s this was not a popular description, becoming gradually more widespread and since the late 1980s
'free and fair' is a very frequently used term to describe elections.
---Figure 1 about here ---
A considerable number of datasets provide assessments of the quality of elections. However, although the term 'free and fair' is in common use, none of the datasets provides information on whether the election was 'free and fair'. 2 Most databases refer instead to the quality of elections (Kelley, 2012) , electoral self-determination (CIRI, 2010) or electoral integrity (Norris et al, 2013) .
Our objective is first to define what we understand by free and fair elections and provide a measurement of the phenomenon. We suggest that 'freeness' of the election refers to the rules of the election and the process leading up to the election. 'Fairness' of the election refers to the events on the election day. Based on ten variables we assess whether the elections were free and fair. We find that about half of all elections are marred by malpractice that lead us to conclude that the election was either unfree or unfair or both. However, our data suggest that there are a number of elections that are unfree but fair (e.g. not all voters were registered but there were no irregularities on the election day). On the other hand there were few elections that were free but unfair, this does not appear to be a popular option when trying to influence the election results. Most observer organisations concentrate on the election as an event, i.e.
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whether the election was fair. Our results suggest that international organisations should monitor more closely the run up to the elections, i.e. whether the elections were free.
Our paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 we define 'free and fair' elections and discuss our empirical measures. Section 3 provides some empirical findings and in Section 4 we discuss the related literature and compare our measure to other proxies of electoral quality. Section 5 offers our conclusions and suggestions for future research.
Definition and Measurement Issues
Elections are a key element of democracy. The origin of the word 'democracy' is Greek and translates as 'rule of the people' and this can be understood to be "a political system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people." (Vanhanen, 2000b: 2) Thus, good quality elections strengthen the newly elected leadership's political legitimacy. Many international organisations and the media use the expression 'free and fair' to describe the quality of the election. However, although the expression 'free and fair' is universally used, there is considerable discussion in the literature how to define the terms and how to measure the quality of elections. Like many phenomena in the social sciences, the 'freeness' and 'fairness' of elections is difficult to define and measure.
In order to develop measures of 'freeness' and 'fairness' we follow the method suggested by Bollen (1990:19) . He advocates starting with a theoretical definition, followed by the identification of the major dimensions, the measurement of each dimension, explanations of the creation of the indicators and how to replicate them, specification of the relationship between each dimension and finally report estimates of reliability and validity.
Definition
As a definition of 'free and fair' election we use the standard as set out in the 'Declaration on The subsequent parts of the declaration set out the meaning of universal suffrage, the rights of citizens to vote, to join a party and to stand in elections as well as the rights and responsibilities of states in the conduct of free and fair elections. The declaration does not define 'freeness' and 'fairness' as such but provides a list of rights and responsibilities that constitute a 'free and fair' election. Based on this declaration we summarize our understanding of the meaning of 'free' and 'fair'. 'Freeness' means that all adult citizens must have the right to be registered and to vote and must be free to make their choice. They also have the right to establish and join parties and campaign freely within the country.
'Fairness' refers to the equal treatment of equals. For example the declaration states that every voter is 'entitled to exercise his or her right equally with others', that voters should have equal and effective access to a polling station and that every party should have an equal opportunity of access to the media.
Major Dimensions
Following on from this theoretical definition we continue by exploring the two major dimensions of our election quality measure. The notion of 'freeness' pertains to the rules of the political contest and according to Elklit and Svensson (1997: 35) it is the precondition for 'fairness'. If these rules are not established, the question of the fair application of these rules is meaningless. This links into another aspect of the notion of 'free and fair' elections: the assessment of elections should cover the entire process, not just the election day. The right to vote, the registration of voters, freedom to stand as a candidate in the election and campaign freely and access to the media are all important in the run up to the elections. After the polls close the votes must be counted accurately and the results from each polling station have to be reported and added up correctly. Complaints have to be handled by an independent agency.
Rigging of the elections does not only happen on the day of the election, but pre-and postelection processes are also open to manipulation (Schedler , 2002) . However, when elections are assessed, international observers concentrate on the election day. Their judgement of 7 whether the election was 'free and fair' is based on the conduct of the vote and count on the election day (Elklit and Svensson, 2005: 149) .
Based on these considerations our measure should not just provide a singular assessment of the quality of the election but should be based on two separate indicators, judging 'freeness' as well as 'fairness'. Both indicators should be available separately. Some elections may be free but not fair. For example all adults are registered to vote but the ballots are miscounted.
Other elections may not be free but fair, for example not all eligible voters are registered but the votes are counted accurately. Neither election would be of a high quality but for different reasons. Related to the two dimensions, a measure of 'free and fair' elections should consider the entire election process not just the events on the election day.
Measurement of the Dimensions
Elections are a complex phenomenon and there are a number of indicators that can potentially provide information on whether the elections were free and fair 5 . Probably no election is perfect in terms of rules and application of the rules. However, in our measurement of electoral malpractice we only want to highlight cases in which the irregularities were not minor but were widespread and did or could have influenced the outcome of the election. Our indicators of freeness and fairness should thus only indicate which rules were (1) intended to skew the electoral process in favour of the incumbent leader or party and (2) application of the rules and events by the leader or the challenger that could have caused the election result to misrepresent the will of the people. For other regimes there is often little information and we code this as missing information rather than assuming that there was no problem.
The second issue is that for countries with observer reports we have plenty of information.
However, the information is not uniform and we have to make some judgements on whether the observed malpractice corresponded to minor irregularities or could have influenced the outcome of the election. We mainly considered what the intent of the rule or its application was and whether this could have benefited the leader (or the challenger). For example some countries do not allow prisoners to vote but even though this rule restricts the registration of voters it is not designed to influence the outcome of the election. If on the other hand supporters of the challenger are systematically left of the voter register we consider this as a malpractice. Since a lot of coding was based on our judgement we compiled a detailed code book to make the coding process as transparent as possible. We are also aware that the presence of observers may have prevented some forms of malpractice, i.e. there might be a 9 systematic measurement bias. More of the problematic elections are observed and we have thus have more information on these elections but the quality of these elections were better due to the presence of observers. We are not able to fix this issue but want to flag it so that users of the data can consider the impact of this bias on their results.
Creation of the indicators and replication
In order to code the quality of each leadership election we created ten indicators. Six pertain to the freeness of the election, i.e. the rules of the election and the process prior to the election day. Four indicators score the fairness of the elections by which we understand the voting and events on or immediately after the election day. If the criteria set out were fulfilled we code the variable one and zero otherwise. We discuss each variable in turn.
Variable 1: Legal Framework
The legal framework guarantees the right to vote and run for office and that elections are run at regular intervals. If any of the following rules were violated, the legal framework indicator received a 0. The legal framework describes the rule of the game. As we will discuss below, these rules are rarely unfree or unfair. It is worth noting that we only require that citizens can vote. We did not assess the justice of citizenship requirements. Thus, occasionally disenfranchised populations exist, but all citizens could vote, and these cases are coded as 1. For example, Liberian citizenship laws require black African origin, and people of other origins may only obtain permanent residency status These permanent residents cannot vote.
Variable 2: Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)
Elections have to be managed independently, otherwise they are deemed to impact on the quality of the election. Many countries have EMBs to insure the quality of the elections. We found that most problems arose from the fact that EMBs were not independent and impartial from the government. Some countries have no EMBs but the elections are managed by government ministries. These were coded as not applicable; it would have been unhelpful to code them as violating criterion 2c as they were often highly reputable elections (for example elections in Belgium, Denmark and Finland).
a. Election boundaries are set so that no one candidate/party is favoured ( Under-registration of voters can be due to different reasons: It may be due to anti-democratic intentions due to capacity issues. We coded as 0 any cases where registration fell below 80%, and for cases over 80% we only coded as 0 if there was evidence of deliberate malpractice.
This threshold was a compromise intended to capture all deliberately antidemocratic regimes, and minimize the number of democratic regimes with a low capacity to be given a 0 coding. Coding of criterion 5d merits some discussion, as it is the only ex-post indicator of an unfair election included in our coding system. Reviewing violations of this criterion, we found no elections where we had reason to suspect the election was clean and the result was entirely due to candidate popularity. Thus, we feel assured that this criterion will not give a misleading impression. For the majority of elections violating this criterion, the likely causes of the outcome were clear from other information we had coded. However, 8 cases had fewer than two other criteria coded, while 5 had been boycotted by the opposition, a fact which is only captured by this criterion within our scheme. For these cases, the coding of 5d provided valuable additional information.
In addition, we are aware that our database does not have any other means of capturing long term systemic advantage. A high proportion of violations of criterion 5d occur in SubSaharan Africa and post-Soviet states, suggesting that the transition from a one party state might well structurally contribute to very skewed vote outcomes. The requirement that no candidate gains over 75% of the vote goes some way to capturing long term disadvantages that may seriously constrain the ability of opposition to mobilize, without any specific actions needing to be taken during the campaign period or voting day.
Variable 6: Campaign Process
Even where the opposition can run de facto, their ability to compete with the incumbent during the campaign process may be hindered. In addition, the opposition may also use this stage of the process to "cheat" (e.g. through vote buying , we did code as 0 for infrequent reports, as these issues are likely to be underreported.
For unsubstantiated but widespread reports, for example in cases where it was evident that all stakeholders assumed bribery occurred, we coded as 0 as substantiation is not a feasible requirement. Where allegations were both unsubstantiated and infrequent, we were perforce guided by the attitude of the authors of our sources when assessing whether to take these allegations as fact and coded as 1.
Variable 7: Media Access
Another opportunity to distort equal competition arises where the media can be manipulated. At times it was a unclear whether a ruling party was receiving more coverage via ongoing news stories, and whether coverage of different groups was qualitatively different. We coded their message effectively and had not been grossly misrepresented, setting aside quarrels about exact parity which we did not have sufficient information to judge. We came across cases where a recount was demanded for a limited number of polling stations, and settled by a court of similar body. Where resolution was peaceful and legal, we did not code as 0 for the original miscount. Likewise did not code as 0 for procedural problems with the count not held to affect the outcome.
A First Look at the Data
Following the above coding guidelines we have been able to code some information on 1,114 elections in 169 countries for the period 1975-2011. For 890 elections we have sufficient information to code whether the elections were free and fair. As Figure 2 shows, the number of elections has increased over time. Due to different election cycles the graph has a lot of 'spikes' but there is a strong positive trend. Per year there were an additional 0.88 elections.
--- Figure 2 about here ---Is this positive trend due to an increase of free and fair elections? Or is it due to an increase in poor quality elections? In order to establish the quality of the election we use variables 1-7 to determine whether the election was free. If at least four variables scored a one, i.e. fulfilled our criteria on the legal framework, EMBs, electoral rights, media access, voter registration, voting process and ballot access, we defined the election as 'free'. If at least two variables out of variables 8-10 fulfilled our criteria on voting process, the role of officials and vote counting, we coded the election as 'fair'. This allows us to categorize elections in different manners. First, we can distinguish between free and fair elections and elections that are marred by any irregularities. Second, we can distinguish between four different types of elections: (1) free and fair elections, (2) unfree and unfair elections, (3) unfree but fair elections and (4) free but unfair elections.
In Figure 3 we sum the total number of elections per five year periods (1975-79, 1980-84, …, 2005-09) to smooth out the series. We plot the free and fair elections in light grey and the unfree and unfair elections in dark grey. Over the entire period about 53 per cent of all elections were free and fair. Figure 3 shows that for the earlier periods the number of problematic elections were considerably lower than the number of free and fair elections.
About 70 per cent of all elections were free and fair. Towards the end of the period there were proportionally more problematic elections, only about 50 per cent of all elections are now free and fair. Thus, the evidence suggests that although the number of elections has increased, the number of problematic elections has increased disproportionally.
--- Figure 3 about here ---often marred by problems in the run up to the election (freeness) or by problems on the election day (fairness)? For 890 elections we can determine whether the election was free and fair and Table 1 have no irregularities in the run up to the elections but are marred for example by voter intimidation or ballot box stuffing on the election day. These elections are free but unfair.
--- Table 1 about here ---
We now turn to a closer inspection of the data by examining (1) regional differences and (2) the characteristics of incumbent elections.
Regional Differences
In Table 2 Table 3 provides a detailed breakdown of (1) free and fair elections, (2) unfree and unfair elections, (3) unfree but fair elections and (4) free but unfair elections.
--- Table 3 about here ---
Incumbent Elections
Incumbent elections deserve particular consideration. Irregularities in elections can occur due to actions taken by incumbents or the challengers. However, there are a number of electoral procedures that incumbents can more easily exert influence over than challengers (Calingaert, 2006) . Take for example voter registration and vote counting where the opposition has fewer opportunities to cheat. Bribing and intimidating voters may thus be tactics more often used by the challengers. For 826 elections we have information on whether the incumbent stood and whether s/he won the election. Out of this sample, 628 were incumbent elections. The cross tabulations in Table 4 show that about 55 per cent of these incumbent elections are free and fair, this is a similar percentage to the whole sample (53 per cent of elections are free and fair, as shown in Table 1 ).
--- Table 4 about here ---Which election tactics characterise (non-)incumbent elections? We compare the tactics in non-incumbent elections (Table 5) to the tactics in incumbent elections (Table 6 ).
--- Tables 5 & 6 about here ---
The biggest difference in election tactics is that in non-incumbent elections the proportion of free but unfair elections is relatively high (about 10 per cent of all elections). At this point it is unclear whether the irregularities on the election day is mainly caused by the incumbent or the challenger. This is an interesting avenue for further inquiry.
Are incumbents more likely to win irregular elections? When incumbents stand in free and fair elections they have a 58 per cent probability of winning, while this probability is increased to 75 per cent if they stand in irregular elections. This is comparable to the figures reported by Collier and Hoeffler (2014) . They calculate that due to irregular tactics incumbents extend their average time in office from 6.4 years to 15.8 years. Furthermore, they suggest that irregular elections matter for economic performance. Due to the employment of irregular tactics incumbents avoid the discipline that elections impose on them: they do not have to rely on providing good economic performance that would increase their chance of re-election.
--- Table 7 about here ---
Other Election Databases -A Comparison

Data on the Quality of Elections
There are a number of databases that provide proxies for 'democracy' and the quality of elections. While democracy is not synonymous with elections, elections are an integral part of the definition of democracy and it is therefore interesting to review some of the democracy indicators as well as databases on elections. We start our discussion with an overview of the most widely used databases and suggest that none of these offer an in depth assessment of whether elections are 'free and fair'. We also consider some of the more recently developed election quality databases. Some offer very detailed information about the 'freeness' and 'fairness' of the elections but only cover a small number of elections. Thus, researchers have to choose between less detailed quality indicators which are available for many years and countries and indicators that are detailed but only available for a small number of elections.
We discuss each dataset with respect to their measurement of the quality of elections. Table 6 provides an overview of all the datasets we considered.
--- Table 8 There are a number of reasons why the use of the Vanhanen Polyarchy data is problematic in the assessment of the 'freeness' and 'fairness' of the election. Vanhanen (2000:255-257) himself provides a critical discussion of the issues. The share of the largest party determines the index of political competition. Electoral systems with proportional representation tend to have more parties gaining seats and thus the competition measure is biased to produce higher values for proportional electoral systems when contrasted with plurality or majority electoral systems.
Another potentially problem is that the Vanhanen competition index does not allow us to distinguish between popularity and fraud. Popular leaders can win landslide victories. On the 20 other hand elections may be won by leaders committing widespread electoral fraud to win at large margins. In both cases the competition indicator would be small but we are unable to distinguish whether this is due to popularity and fraud (Hyde and Marinov, 2011) .
Participation rates do not only reflect the 'freeness' of elections, but also the difference in national laws. In some countries, for example Austria, voters are legally obliged to vote.
Participation rates also depend on the age structure of a country, in countries with a large youth bulge the participation rate is lower. There is also a potential endogeneity issue. The empirical study by Birch (2010) suggests that voters are more likely to turn out if they perceive the elections to be free and fair.
Freedom House
Other democracy definitions focus less narrowly on elections. Freedom is at the centre of the lists, voter intimidation, physical violence, bribery. 9 Unfortunately, while this dataset is widely used and trusted, there is no further information why the coding was given. It also does not allow for a distinction whether problematic elections were unfree (e.g. limits and irregularities in voter registration, party campaigning) or unfair (e.g. voter intimidation, fraudulent vote counting) or both.
QED and DIEM
Two datasets that provide information on the quality of elections are the Quality of Elections for moderate problems. 'Acceptability' takes a value of one if the organisation judges the election to be free and fair, it takes a value of 0.5 if the organisation's report is ambiguous and zero if the organisation states that the election does not represent the will of the voters and was not free and fair. Thus, the QED dataset provides an assessment of whether elections were free and fair. There are also variables coding whether there were problems prior to the elections and on the election day itself. These measures can be interpreted as assessment of whether the election is 'free' (prior to the election) and 'fair' (election day). The variables include cheating before the election (e.g. restrictions on campaigns) and on the election day (e.g. ballot box tampering). The QED database also provides information on problems on violence and unrest prior to the elections and on the election day.
More detailed information on the election process and election day is provided by the DIEM database. The information spans 306 elections in 109 countries from 1980 to 2004. These are elections that were reported on by election monitors, typically these elections are in the middle spectrum of democracy. There is information on the legal framework, information on the limits to the scope of elective offices and data on the limits who can run for office.
NELDA
A data collection effort that concentrates on measuring electoral competition is the dataset on National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) as presented in Hyde and Marinov (2011) . They base their understanding of competition on Sartori (1976) , making a distinction between competition as 'the structure or rule of the game' and competitiveness as the outcome of that game. The main aim of the NELDA dataset is to provide information on elections that can be lost. Only competitive elections can be lost and Hyde and Marinov (2011:192) code elections as competitive when all three of the following criteria are fulfilled:
(1) opposition must be allowed, (2) multiple parties are legal and (3) more than one candidate competes. They argue that these ex-ante measures are better suited to assess whether competition is possible. Ex-post or outcome based measures, such as the share of votes of the largest party can reflect the popularity of the leader but they can also reflect large scale election fraud. Thus, the share of votes does not necessarily reflect the degree of competition 24 (Hyde and Marinov, 2011:199) . Since the NELDA measures of competition concentrate on 'the rules of the game' they provide a judgement of the 'freeness' aspect of the quality of elections.
IEM
The Index of Electoral Malpractice (Birch 2011 ) is based on election observer reports and is available for four regions: (1 
PEI
There are a number of recent data collection efforts that provide detailed information on elections. We only mention these briefly because they only span a relatively small number of elections. Due to the small number of observations it is difficult to compare. Elklit and Reynolds (2005) introduce a framework for the systematic study of election quality. Based on this work they provide detailed information on 15 elections, assessing the election quality and the management of the elections in 54 indicators per election. The project on Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) as described by Norris et al (2013) provides a wealth of information on elections, ranging from the assessment of the legal framework, the quality of the election 25 and surveys of public opinion. At the end of its pilot phase the PEI project had coded 20
elections.
IAEP and Archigos
Lastly, we want to mention two other important databases which provide information on political leadership and elections but do not provide detailed information on the quality of whether the political leader has the power to call elections. However, the database does not provide any assessment of the conduct of the elections. Another impressive data collection effort is Archigos, a database on political leaders (Chiozza, Goemans and Gleditsch, 2009 ).
Archigos provides detailed information on the 'effective' leader of a country, i.e. the person that de facto exercises power in a country. This includes the manner in which s/he came to power and left office. Entry and exit from political power can be regular (e.g. through elections) or irregular (e.g. coup d'etat, assassination). However, since the main focus is on leaders and not on elections, there is no detailed information on the quality of elections.
Data Comparison
For each one of the large-n databases we either used their measure of free and fair elections or created a variable on free and fair elections. We are conscious that most datasets discussed above do not aim to assess whether an election was free and fair and apply different concepts to measure the quality of political democracy or elections. However, in order to make a comparison of the data possible we decided to construct a measure of free and fair elections from each dataset. The various measures of election quality have different scales and we force all of these indicators into a dichotomous variable to assess whether the election was free and fair. Table 7 provides information on how we constructed the free and fair election indicators based on the following datasets: Polyarchy, Polity IV, DPI, CIRI, QED and NELDA.
--- Table 9 about here ---
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The various measures of the quality of elections are only weakly correlated with each other.
The two variables that are most highly correlated are the QED and CIRI measure (ρ=0.59).
Correlation coefficients presented in Table 8 reveal that our measure of free and fair elections is correlated with the Polity IV measure (ρ=0.63) and the CIRI and QED measures (ρ=0.52).
It is only weakly correlated with the Polyarchy measure (ρ=0.25) and the NELDA measure (ρ=0.1). Cross-tabulations suggest that the biggest source of disagreement between our coding and the CIRI and QED measures are elections that we code as not free and fair but CIRI and QED do.
--- Table 10 about here ---
The QED database offers information on irregularities before the election and irregularities on the election day and thus corresponds closely with our measures of freeness and fairness.
The correlation between the two measures of freeness is lower (ρ=0.4) than the correlation between the measures of fairness (ρ=0.56). Cross-tabulations suggest that QED and our freeness measure disagree in about 20 per cent of the cases, half due to QED coding elections as free while we code them as unfree and vice versa. In the case of fairness QED and our measure disagree on about 40 per cent of the cases and they all fall in the category of us coding the election as unfair and QED coding the election as fair.
Discussion
The holding of elections has become almost universal but only about half of all elections have been free and fair during the period 1975-2011. Electoral malpractice not only distorts the quality of representation but has implications for political, social and economic outcomes (see for example Birch, 2011; Chauvet and Collier, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2014) .
Although a number of databases offer an assessment of the quality of elections they do not correspond to the notion of whether the election was free and fair. Existing data collection efforts either offer information on democracy and elections for a large number of countries and years but this information tends to be relatively broad, for example describing electoral fraud in a dichotomous variable, and the documentation tends to offer no further details (e.g. DPI and CIRI). Other databases offer much more detail but only cover elections in authoritarian regimes or semi-democracies (e.g. DAE and IEM). More recently established databases offer a wealth of information on electoral (mal)practices but only cover a very small number of elections (e.g. PEI). We are trying to close this gap in the literature by (1) providing an assessment of the quality of election that is closely tied to the commonly used term 'free and fair elections', (2) by providing information on all elections, irrespective of regime and (3) providing sufficient information on elections so that we and other researchers can make a judgement on whether an election was free and fair. We provide ten variables measuring the rules of the election, the process before the election and events on and immediately after the election day. Our data cover 1,114 elections in 169 countries over 37
years and we provide a detailed codebook to make our coding decisions transparent and replicable.
Currently we have sufficient data on 890 elections to provide some summary statistics and comparisons with existing electoral quality measures. According to our proxy only about half of the elections are free and fair. We suggest that 'freeness' of the election refers to the rules of the election and the process leading up to the election. 'Fairness' of the election refers to the events on the election day. Based on ten variables we assess whether the elections were free and fair. Our data suggest that there are a number of elections that are unfree but fair (e.g. not all voters were registered but there were no irregularities on the election day). On the other hand there were few elections that were free but unfair, this does not appear to be a popular option when trying to rig the election. Most observer organisations concentrate on the election as an event, i.e. whether the election was fair. Our results suggest that international organisations should more closely monitor the run up to the elections, i.e. whether the elections were free.
Preliminary analysis indicates that a higher than average proportion of elections in SubSaharan Africa are characterized by malpractice. We want to further document and investigate what makes African elections unfree and unfair. Is this due to irregularities in the voter registration or vote counting or due to bribery, voter intimidation and violence?
Comparisons with other variables on electoral quality show that our measure is correlated with existing proxies. Conceptually our attempt to measure the freeness and fairness of the election is closest to CIRI and QED. However, the comparison shows that we tend to be more conservative in our judgement. We classify fewer elections as free and fair.
Our database can be used to explore a number of different issues. One project could be to 1945 1948 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 Google Count 'Free and Fair Elections' 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 Number of F&F and not F&F Elections in SSA ffelec not f&f Note: Some datasets follow a country year format (Polyarchy, Polity IV, DPI, CIRI) and code variables irrespective of whether an election took place during that year. If there was no election during that year values represent the most recent election. Other datasets code elections (QED and NELDA) and report data for individual elections. To merge the datasets we only considered the election years as stated in DPI and QED and NELDA. For years with multiple elections we only used the information of the election with the lowest quality. 
Tables
